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1. Introduction 
While government intervention in economic activity is all-pervasive in many countries, two 
influential but diametrically opposite theories speculate about its motivation and rationale. The 
public-interest theory, put forward in Pigou (1938), states that the government acts to achieve 
social benefit and to correct market failures. In contrast, the capture theory, originated by Stigler 
(1971), hypothesizes that the government is an agent of powerful commercial interests.
2 Similar 
arguments can be found in the rent-seeking literature (see Krueger, 1974). These competing 
views and some of their implications are discussed in depth in Glaeser and Shleifer (2003). In 
reality, however, government policies rarely correspond to either of the two extremes. 
Progressive income taxation, uniform public education, old-age policies, and air-pollution 
regulations are all examples of public-interest-minded approaches, and they are commonly used 
across countries. In contrast, monopoly regulation, trade policies, and financial regulations are 
often viewed as being to a large extent influenced by commercial interests, the extent of which 
may in principle vary significantly across countries. 
In light of these considerations, it is useful to characterize the circumstances of firms’ 
influence on government policies, and its consequences, by determining the profile of politically 
influential firms—specifically, the characteristics that make firms more likely to exert political 
influence—and by identifying the extent to which these firms stand to disproportionately gain 
and the policy aspects that are especially prone to political influence. To the extent that 
government policies are found to be responsive to the influence of business firms, this would 
provide support for Stigler’s (1971) view of government intervention. This paper provides an 
analytical framework for and an empirical scrutiny of these issues.   
Conceptually, the paper is related to the literature on the motives of public officials, 
particularly in the field of regulation as reviewed in Glaeser and Shleifer (2003). It is also related 
to the literature on corruption (see Aidt, 2003, for a review). The specific model builds on Choi 
and Thum (2007) in viewing the interaction between politicians and firms in the context of a 
mutual exchange of favors, whereby the former provide economic perks to the latter and receive 
political contributions in return. This is consistent with observed interactions between politicians 
                                                           
2 Cf., “With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give away money, the state can and does selectively help or 
hurt a vast number of industries” (Stigler, 1971).   4
and pressure groups (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998 and 2005). Empirically, the paper is related 
to the emerging literature that seeks to determine the extent to which politically connected firms 
are able to generate gains for themselves. This literature typically focuses on financial-market 
outcomes such as access to credit or firm value (see for example, Faccio, 2006a; Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So, 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; and references therein). Another focus closer to 
this paper’s emphasis is firms’ ability to affect legislation (Stratmann, 2002). Earlier literature, 
represented by Fisman (2001) and Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2006), analyzed important events 
that could have affected firms depending on the extent of their political connections. Much of this 
research was done in the context of a specific country—often a developing country (Indonesia, in 
Fisman, 2001) or, alternatively, the United States. More recently, Faccio (2006b) and Faccio and 
Parsley (2006) studied the determinants and the outcomes of political connections in a cross-
country sample. This literature has provided a very useful empirical framework and insights, 
generally concluding that political connections matter, especially in countries with weak 
institutions. 
This paper examines a different range of outcomes pertaining to policy impact. Our 
approach complements the earlier literature in several regards. First, the existing literature 
typically employs direct involvement of politicians in the operation of a firm as a proxy for 
political connections. Arguing that such direct political connections are only one channel through 
which firms may affect policymaking, we focus on the more general issue of firms’ influence 
using information on their own perceptions.
3 This approach captures the lobbying of politicians, 
which has been of documented significance in the United States (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998 
and 2005). To this end, we use the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a large firm-
level survey across countries recently conducted by the World Bank that elicits firms’ responses 
about their policy influence at various levels of policymaking across the globe. The same dataset 
also contains information about perceived policy outcomes from the firms’ perspective. The 
richness of information provides an opportunity to study a wide array of policies and to assess 
which are particularly sensitive to influence. Complementing Faccio (2006b) and Faccio and 
Parsley (2006), this is done using a large sample of firms in a cross-country context. 
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political influence.   5
Many of our findings are consistent with the existing literature. For example, we find that 
larger, government-owned firms and those less exposed to competition exert more policy 
influence. We also confirm earlier results indicating that such influence translates into 
(perceived) outcomes, whereby more-influential firms regard government policies and 
regulations as being relatively more helpful than do less-influential firms. In contrast to existing 
results, however, we find that a country’s institutional quality has an independent effect on   
perceived outcomes and does not act to moderate the effect of firms’ political influence. Overall, 
therefore, we find some support for the capture theory, which manifests itself universally across 
the countries considered. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the framework and its analysis, 
Section 3 presents the empirical findings, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
 
2.1 Basic Model 
 
The simple model below is based on the idea that politicians and firms exchange mutually 
beneficial favors, which is consistent with the theories presented in Stigler (1971) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994). Politicians supply economic benefits such as advantageous tax treatment, 
preferential access to publicly provided goods, and exemptions from complying with costly 
regulatory requirements, while firms make political contributions. This framework extends the 
recent very elegant model of Choi and Thum (2007) to the case of heterogeneous firms.   
Consider the interaction between the ruling government and n firms, indexed i. The firms 
are differentiated by their wealth, wi, which also stands as a proxy for firm size. Firms can be 
politically connected or not; PC denotes the former. Firms that are not politically connected, i 
∉PC, pay a proportional tax of T, so that their net wealth is wi(1-T). The politically connected 
firms,  i  ∈PC, are exempt from paying the tax and may derive additional benefits, such as 
exemption from regulations, preferential access to certain public goods, or subsidization of their 
products. The expected value of these perks depends on the probability of the government’s 
survival, which, in turn, depends on the amount of political contributions. If xi denotes the 
amount of such contributions made by firm I, then X =  ∑
∈PC j
j x  denotes the aggregate amount of   6
contributions made by politically connected firms. Provided that wealth constraints are binding, 
the firm’s net wealth after having made political contributions is wi-xi. A politically connected 
firm derives utility from the aggregate amount of contributions, which determines the expected 
value of the perks, and the net wealth. 
 
 U
PC(X, wi-xi) = αlog(X) + βlog(wi-xi), 0 < α,β  <  1      (1) 
where the logarithmic specification is assumed in order to obtain closed-form solutions. In 
contrast, the utility of a firm that is not politically connected is U
NPC = βlog(wi(1-T)). 
This modeling of political influence through political contributions that buy perks is 
consistent with the empirical analysis below. It generalizes a view implicit in the existing 
empirical literature that influential firms are solely distinguished by the direct involvement of 
politicians in their operations. While this direct link does characterize some firms, we argue that 
political influence can be acquired through other means. Elaborate empirical support for this view 
of acquiring political influence is provided in Kroszner and Stratmann (1998 and 2005).  
The government, therefore, has two sources of revenue at its disposal: political 
contributions  X and tax revenues (1-γ)T ∑
∉PC j
j w , where the parameter 0 <  γ < 1 represents 
potential inefficiency associated with tax collection. This may result from administrative 
inefficiencies, for example, or from the presence of an informal sector, or from allocative 
distortions. Without considering the precise mechanism, we interpret this inefficiency as a 
general institutional weakness. The two revenue sources are not, however, perfect substitutes. 
Political contributions very specifically benefit the government per se, whereas tax revenues 
serve the broader needs of the population; the government must weigh the two options depending 
on its valuation of its own survival versus the public interest. The government’s objective is to 
maximize a weighted sum  
 
 X  +  λ(1-γ)T ∑
∉PC j
j w ,  λ  >  0      (2) 
where λ is interpreted as the weight of the public benevolence motive, assuming that tax revenues 
are used for the public benefit. It could be interpreted as the strength of democratic institutions 
that discipline the government to act in the best interests of its citizens.   7
The government approaches firms and offers them political alliance. These firms then 
become politically connected—they receive perks and offer political contributions. The rest of 
the firms pay their taxes. The game thus consists of two stages, whereby in the first stage the 
government makes its alliance offer, and then the politically connected firms determine their 
contributions. These decisions lead to the pay-offs of the involved actors. 
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis 
We begin the analysis with the last stage, whereby the politically connected firms make their 
political contributions. It is easy to see that this is a standard game of the provision of a public 
good. To study its equilibrium, we assume—without loss of generality, as will be argued 
below—that all firms make strictly positive contributions. 
The first order conditions determining a firm’s contributions are then given by 
maximizing (1): 
 
α/X - β/(wi-xi) = 0, or   α(wi-xi) = βX         (3) 
Aggregating, we then obtain the following equilibrium values and the utility levels: 
  X = α ∑
∈PC j
j w / (α + kβ); wi - xi = β ∑
∈PC j
j w / (α + kβ);  
xi = wi - β ∑
∈PC j
j w / (α + kβ),  
Ui
PC = (α+β)log( ∑
∈PC j
j w / (α + kβ)) + αlog(α) + βlog(β)     (4) 
where k = |PC| . In the first stage, the government forms a political alliance with a subset of firms. 
In so doing, it hopes to achieve the objective of maximizing (2), or, substituting from (4), 
 
  α ∑
∈PC j
j w / (α + kβ) + λ(1-γ)T ∑
∉PC j
j w =  
α ∑
∈PC j
j w / (α + kβ) + λ(1-γ)T(W - ∑
∈PC j
j w ) =  
λ(1-γ)TW +  ∑
∈PC j
j w [α / (α + kβ) - λ(1-γ)T]        ( 5 )    8






is the aggregate wealth of all firms in the economy. 
Suppose now that α/(α + β) > λ(1-γ)T; if this is not satisfied, then the set of politically 
connected firms optimally selected by the government is empty. Also, assume without loss of 
generality that w1 > w2 > … > wn. We first observe that if a firm is not expected to provide a 
political contribution, it will not be approached by the government, thus supporting the 
assumption above that all politically influential firms make positive contributions.   
Also, as follows from an examination of (5), the optimal strategy for the government is to 
form alliances with sufficiently wealthy firms, so that in particular i ∈PC, if and only if: 
 
wi > wk, where α / (α + kβ) > λ(1-γ)T and α / (α + (k+1)β) < λ(1-γ)T   (6) 
It follows from the characterization in (6) that the number of politically connected firms is a 
decreasing function of the government’s benevolence and an increasing function of tax 
inefficiency. Since political influence in the model is related to the number of politically 
connected firms, the main results can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 1. Wealthier (or larger) firms are the politically connected ones. 
Furthermore, the extent of political influence is a decreasing function of the government’s actions 
on behalf of the public interest and an increasing function of institutional weakness. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
 
3.1 Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
The survey under analysis here was conducted by the World Bank Group in partnership with 
many other institutions in order to 
•  determine the state of the private sector in client countries;  
•  measure the quality of governance and public services, including the extent of 
corruption;  
•  provide better information on constraints to private-sector growth—from an 
enterprise perspective;  
•  establish the basis for internationally comparable indicators that can track changes 
in the business environment over time, thus allowing for both competitive 
assessments and impact assessments of market-oriented reforms; and  
•  stimulate systematic public-private dialogue on business perceptions and the 
agenda for reform.   9
 
The field work was carried out between 1999 and 2000 by a private polling of firms that 
fulfilled the basic requirements for sector, size, location, and ownership/firm characteristics.
4 The 
objective was to gather information on a sizeable number of firms around the world, and it was 
accomplished for most of the sample.
5 The sample consists of firm-level survey responses from 
thousands of firms in about 80 countries, many of them developing and in transition. The survey 
asked each business to rank the constraints or problems that had an impact on its operations. This 
process involved an extensive questionnaire presented via a face-to-face interview with either the 
firm’s managers or owners. As a result, the survey reports comparative measurements based on 
firms’ perceptions of their business environment as shaped by a variety of economic and policy 
factors.  
In order to test the model’s implications, we use as proxies for the firms’ influence the 
answers to questions regarding the firm’s ability to influence the government with respect to 
laws, rules, regulations, or decrees that have a substantial impact on the firm. The responses 
range from “1=never influential” to “5=very influential.” In particular, the survey asked about the 
                                                           
4 The particular requirements that had to be fulfilled by the sample selected were as follows. Sector: In each country, 
the sectoral composition in terms of manufacturing (including agroprocessing) versus services (including commerce) 
will be determined by relative contribution to GDP, subject to a 15 percent minimum for each category. Size: At least 
15 percent of the sample shall be in the small-size category and 15 percent in the large-size category. Ownership: At 
least 15 percent of the firms will have foreign control. Exporters: At least 15 percent of firms will be exporters, 
meaning that some significant share of their output is exported. Location: At least 15 percent of firms will be in the 
category “small city or countryside.” 
5 The countries and number of firms (in parentheses) included in the survey are: Albania (133), Argentina (57), 
Armenia (106), Azerbaijan (102), Belarus (98), Bolivia (55), Botswana (49), Brazil (80), Bulgaria (99), Cameroon 
(39), Canada (43), Chile (45), China (47), Colombia (57), Costa Rica (31), Cote d'Ivoire (52), Croatia (97), Czech 
Republic (110), Dominican Republic (58), Ecuador (42), Egypt (11), El Salvador (39), Estonia (120), Ethiopia (35), 
France (33), Germany (47), Ghana (31), Guatemala (22), Haiti (20), Honduras (23), Hungary (105), Indonesia (39), 
Italy (48), Kazakhstan (97), Kenya (59), Lithuania (112), Madagascar (48), Malawi (30), Malaysia (22), Mexico 
(30), Moldova (98), Namibia (47), Nicaragua (17), Nigeria (32), Pakistan (30), Panama (30), Peru (51), Philippines 
(44), Poland (196), Portugal (16), Romania (100), Russia (498), Senegal (18), Singapore (64), Slovakia (106), 
Slovenia (100), South Africa (63), Spain (59), Sweden (69), Tanzania (25), Thailand (211), Trinidad and Tobago 
(50), Tunisia (30), Turkey (119), United Kingdom (32), United States (32), Uganda (53), Ukraine (197), Uruguay 
(31), Venezuela (54), Zambia (42), Zimbabwe (66).   10
extent of the influence on the executive, the legislature, the sector ministries, and the regulatory 
agencies. Examining the distribution of the responses to these questions, we find some similar 
patterns. For instance, about 7 percent of the surveyed firms consider themselves to be 
“frequently” or “very influential,” while about 30 percent report themselves as being just 
“influential” or “seldom influential,” and around 60 percent consider themselves “never 
influential.” This pattern of responses remains essentially the same regardless of the specific 
variable considered. In fact, we employ all these variables as alternative measures in order to test 
for robustness. Also, in order to be able to extract some policy implications from our empirical 
analysis, we use as proxies for the perception of institutional constraints on firms’ growth 
questions related to the firm’s perception of the constraints imposed by the tax authorities, tax 
regulations, and the quality of the judiciary system.  
Additionally, we include countrywide variables, such as the regulatory quality and the 
logarithm of the per capita GDP. The former is taken from the World Bank’s Governance 
Matters indicators (Kaufman, et al., 2005), a well-known and comprehensive compilation; this 
index is taken as an average for the period 1998 to 2002, to proxy for the long-term quality of the 
institutional framework. The per capita GDP comes from the World Development Indicators 
(2006), also as an average for the period 1998-2002. Finally, as basic controls, we base our 
specification on existing literature and, in particular, include basic firm characteristics such as 
ownership, size, competition in the particular market, and industrial sector. Table 1 provides 
detailed definitions of all the variables used in this paper, Table 2 provides the corresponding 
summary statistics, and Table 3 exhibits the correlation matrix along with corresponding 
statistical significance. One interesting observation from the correlation matrix is the relatively 
high correlations (of around 0.80) between perceptions of influence on the legislature, ministries, 
the executive, and the regulatory agency.   
 
3.2  Determinants of Influence 
In order to provide empirical support for the theoretical model presented above, we first focus on 
the determinants of firm influence on the government and test the following characterization of 
politically connected firms as follows: 
ic c ic ic Z X I ε β β α + + + = 2 1                                                  (7)   11
where Iic represents our interest variable, namely, the level of influence a firm i has on the 
government of country c; Xic is a matrix of firm characteristics related to the ownership of the 
firm, the sector where it operates, the level of competition it faces in its particular market, and the 
size of the firm; and Zc contains a set of country characteristics related to the institutional 
environment and the wealth of the country. Finally, εic is a random error term. 
Several authors
6  have argued that countries eager to attract foreign investors will be 
subjected to influence by the latter at certain government levels. Our dataset includes information 
about foreign ownership, which allows us to test this hypothesis. Firm ownership—public or 
private—can also have an impact, and we have information on this aspect as well. It could be 
argued that ownership concentration allows for more efficient collusion between managers to 
influence the policies affecting the firm. Fortunately, the WBES includes information on the 
percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders of the company. The concentration 
shown by firms in our sample seems to be high—on average, 38.8 percent of the firms’ shares are 
held by the three largest shareholders. Nevertheless, the standard deviation is also high (43 
percent).  
Table 4 shows the results of our benchmark specification for the determinants of the 
influence on the government. Since our dependent variable has five categories that range from 1 
(never influential) to 5 (very influential), we use ordered probit regressions and show the 
coefficients in the tables. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the marginal coefficients for each 
category of our benchmark specification (Column 1 in Table 4).
7 We use several measures of the 
influence firms usually have on new laws and regulations affecting the firms on different levels 
of government—the national executive, the legislature, sectoral ministries, and regulatory 
agencies. We observe from the outset that our results are very similar across regressions, which is 
not very surprising given the high correlations between the various channels of influence as noted 
above.   
Unlike some previous studies (O’Neal, 1994), we do not find that foreign-owned 
companies have more influence on any level of the government than national companies. On the 
other hand, state-owned firms are found to be substantially more influential than privately owned 
                                                           
6 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Li and Xu (2002), Irwin and Kroszner (1999), and Lissowska (2005). 
7 For the sake of economy, we do not show the marginal coefficients of the remaining regressions. The results are 
similar to the ones shown and are available upon request.   12
firms. Additionally, as expected, we also find that firms with more concentrated ownership 
structures have more influence on every level of the government.  
The WBES includes a question on the degree of competitiveness of the specific market 
where the firm operates, which allows us to address the empirical question of whether 
competitive markets help avoid or enhance behaviors supporting the capture theory first proposed 
by Stigler (1971). To the extent that competition implies smaller profit margins (and hence, firm 
wealth), this would also be a test of the model’s implication. We find that firms operating in more 
competitive markets have significantly less influence on all levels of the government on average 
than those operating in the context of oligopolistic or monopolistic markets.
8  
We include dummies to control for the size of the firm, as measured by the number of 
employees it currently has. Consistent with one of the main predictions of the theoretical model, 
we find that the larger the firms, the more influential they are—at all levels of government. It is 
also reasonable to expect that firms with more workers may on average be wealthier. This is 
particularly true for the firms included in our sample, since most are either in the service sector 
(44 percent), the manufacturing sector (34 percent), or the construction sector (10 percent), all of 
which tend to be labor-intensive areas that will more likely reflect the high correlation between 
wealth and size.
9   
Finally, among the country-level variables included in the analysis, we take into account 
the institutional quality (as measured by the quality of the regulatory system) and the wealth level 
of the country (proxied by the GDP per capita). As expected, there is a negative relationship 
between a country’s wealth and the influence firms have on the government. Also, we find a 
significant and positive relationship between the regulatory quality and the extent of influence 
firms have on different government levels. This finding is consistent with the results of our 
theoretical model. 
3.3  Consequences of Influence 
From an empirical perspective, a natural extension of these findings is to focus on whether firm 
influence really pays off. In order to answer this question, we assess the impact that the ability to 
                                                           
8 The regression analysis is robust to the exclusion of this variable. 
9 Note that among the firm-level controls, we also include industrial-sector dummies.   13
influence the government has on the obstacles firms experience for their growth. Specifically, we 
address this issue using the following empirical specification:  
 
ic c ic ic ic Z I X y ε β β β α + + + + = 3 2 1                                          (8) 
where yic represents the obstacles for growth perceived by firm i in country c; Xic is a matrix of 
firm characteristics; Zc includes several country-level controls, which include an index of the 
overall regulatory quality, and a measurement of the wealth level of the country; and εic is a 
white-noise error term.
10  
Tables 5 and 6 assess the impact of this influence on the perception firms have of the 
constraints imposed by particular policies on their growth. Particularly, we study whether a 
firm’s influence on the executive, legislature, ministries, or regulatory agencies actually 
decreases its perception that the (poor) quality of the judiciary system and tax 
administration/regulation constitutes an obstacle for its growth. We observe that foreign firms 
perceive taxes and regulations to be an obstacle for growth, but the effect is not significant with 
regard to tax authorities and the quality of the judiciary. On the other hand, government-owned 
enterprises view taxes and regulations, the tax authorities, and the judiciary as serious constraints 
for growth. Surprisingly, neither ownership concentration, firm size, nor the competitiveness of 
the markets seem to be relevant to the firms’ perception of the obstacles for their development. 
Among the country-level controls included, we observe that the quality of the regulatory system 
has a moderating impact on constraints for growth, which attests to the importance of the 
institutional environment.   
The level of influence on the executive yields a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in all the corresponding regressions in Table 5.
11 Firms with a higher level of influence 
on the executive perceive that government policies are helpful, rather than obstructive, to their 
growth. Table 6 presents the results of similar regressions, but includes the influence on the 
legislature, sectoral ministries, and regulatory agencies instead of on the executive.
12 The results 
                                                           
10 As before, our dependent variable is a categorical one, so we therefore use an ordered probit approach. 
11 The marginal coefficients for the benchmark regression in Table 5 can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
12 The results in Table 6 come from regression models similar to the ones shown in Table 5. For space reasons, we 
do not show the other coefficients, but the results hold similar to the ones above. The complete regression tables are 
available upon request.   14
confirm that more influential firms at any level of government tend to view taxes or judicial 
institutions as less of a constraint for growth. 
We also replicate the same benchmark specification used in the previous tables, adding an 
interactive variable that captures the possible link between influence and the regulatory quality of 
the country. For the sake of economy, Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients of the firm’s 
influence on the government: one for the interactive term between this variable and one on 
regulatory quality, as well as the computed overall effect evaluated at the sample average of 
regulatory quality.
13 As before, we obtain a negative and statistically significant overall effect of 
the influence on the government in all the regressions, although the interactive term appears to be 
insignificant. This is in contrast with the existing literature (see Faccio, 2006b, and Goldman, 
Rocholl and So, 2006, for examples), which argues for a moderating effect of institutional quality 
on firms’ ability to affect policy outcomes. The difference in the measurement of political 
influence as pointed out above could be one reason for the difference in results. Nevertheless, our 
analysis suggests that firms’ ability to skew policies in their favor is quite independent of a 
country’s institutional quality. Further, when comparing the overall effect of the influence 
variable, namely the impact of the influence variable by itself in addition to the impact of the 
interaction between influence and regulation, we find that the resulting coefficients are very 
similar to the coefficients that do not take into account any interactive term between such 
variables. This may also indicate that the effect of influence on government and the effect of 
institutional framework are, essentially, independent of each other.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Based on a simple model of political influence, this paper studies firm-level determinants as well 
as consequences. To this end, we employ a large cross-country dataset with information on firms’ 
perceptions of their political influence. In this regard, the study differs from the earlier literature 
that typically uses directly observable proxies for firm influence, such as politicians’ involvement 
in business operations. We find that government ownership, firm size, and a less competitive 
environment are all associated with firm perceptions of having influence on government policies. 
                                                           
13 The full results of these regressions are very similar to the ones shown in previous tables and are available upon 
request.   15
These results hold across the various influence channels examined. Additionally, political 
influence is moderated by a high level of institutional quality in a country. These results are by 
and large consistent with and complement previous studies. We then examine the consequences 
of political influence by studying firm perceptions of government policies and regulations. 
Consistent with the exhibited model, we find that political influence is associated with firms’ 
viewing such interventions as posing less of a barrier to the firms’ growth. We interpret this as 
supporting evidence for an argument that political influence translates into policies that reflect 
commercial interests, thus lending indirect support to the capture theory of government 
intervention (Stigler, 1971). We also find that this holds independently of overall institutional 
quality, which contrasts with previous studies.   16
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Table 1. Description of Variables 
 
Variable  Description 
Firm Characteristics   
Company is owned by a 
foreign investor 
Answer to the question on the nationality of the owners. The variable takes the value of 1 if the company is 
owned by a foreign investor, and 0 otherwise. 
Company is owned by the 
government 
Answer to the question on the ownership of the firm. The variable takes the value of 1 if the company is 
owned by the government, and 0 otherwise. 
Holding of the three largest 
shareholders  % of the total shares held by the three largest shareholders of the firm. 
Size: Medium  A firm is defined as medium if it has between 51 and 500 employees. 
Size: Large  A firm is defined as large if it has more than 500 employees. 
Manufacturing  Firm belongs to the manufacturing sector. 
Service  Firm belongs to the service sector. 
Agriculture  Firm belongs to the agricultural sector. 
Construction  Firm belongs to the construction sector. 
Number of competitors  Number of competitors in the same line of business. Takes the value of 1 when the firm reports having no 
competitors, 2 when it has 1–3 competitors, and 3 when it has more than three competitors. 
Influence on the government 
Influence on the executive  When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your 
business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the national level of the executive on the 
content of that law, rule, regulation or decree? Would you say “very influential,” “frequently influential,” 
“influential,” “seldom influential,” or “never influential”? 
Influence on the legislature  When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your 
business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the national level of the legislature on the 
content of that law, rule, regulation or decree? Would you say “very influential,” “frequently influential,” 
“influential,” “seldom influential,” or “never influential”? 
Influence on the ministries  When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your 
business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the national level of the ministries on the 
content of that law, rule, regulation or decree? Would you say “very influential,” “frequently influential,” 
“influential,” “seldom influential,” or “never influential”? 
Influence on regulatory 
agencies 
When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your 
business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the national level of the regulatory agencies 
on the content of that law, rule, regulation or decree? Would you say “very influential,” “frequently 
influential,” “influential,” “seldom influential,” or “never influential”? 
Obstacles for growth   
Taxes and regulations  Answer to the question: Please judge on a four-point scale how problematic the following factors are for 
the operation and growth of your business: Taxes and regulations. (1) major obstacle; (2) moderate 
obstacle; (3) minor obstacle; (4) no obstacle. 
Tax administration 
regulations 
Answer to the question: Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are the following factors for 
the operation and growth of your business: tax administration regulations. (1) major obstacle; (2) moderate 
obstacle; (3) minor obstacle; (4) no obstacle.. 
Confidence in the judicial 
system today 
Answer to the statement: “I am confident that the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights 
in business disputes.” The answer ranges from 1 to 6, where 1=fully disagree, and 6=fully agree. 
Country characteristics   
Regulatory  quality  Index that assesses the extent of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies in the country. Source: 
Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). 
Log (GDP pc)  Logarithm of the average per capita GDP for the period 1998-2002. Expressed in Constant 2000 US 
dollars. Source: World Development Indicators (2006). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Firm Characteristics                
Company is owned by a foreign investor  4951  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Company is owned by the government  4951  0.07  0.26  0  1 
Holding of the three largest shareholders  4951  38.79  42.64  0  100 
Size: Medium  4951  0.40  0.49  0  1 
Size: Large  4951  0.17  0.38  0  1 
Manufacturing 4951  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Service 4951  0.44  0.50  0  1 
Agriculture 4951  0.07  0.26  0  1 
Construction 4951  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Influence on the government                
Influence on the executive  3241  1.57  0.93  1  5 
Influence on the legislature  3243  1.54  0.92  1  5 
Influence on the ministries  3233  1.57  0.94  1  5 
Influence on regulatory agencies  3182  1.63  0.98  1  5 
Obstacles for growth       
Taxes and regulations  4951  3.011  0.960  1  4 
Tax administration regulations  4912  2.88  1.02  1  4 
Confidence in the judicial system today  4775  3.40  1.43  1  6 
Country characteristics                
Regulatory quality   4951  0.14  0.79  -2.12  1.96 
Log  (GDP  pc)  4951 7.56 1.16 4.57  10.37 
   20














owned by a 
foreign investor 
Company is 




















0.812                                      Influence on the legislature 
0.000                       
0.772  0.794                      Influence on the ministries 
0.000  0.000                     
0.717  0.736  0.769                    Influence on regulatory 
agencies 
0.000  0.000  0.000                   
0.104  0.068  0.105 0.103                   Company is owned by a 
foreign investor 
    0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000                  
0.086  0.041  0.079 0.069  0.015                 Company is owned by the 
government  
0.000  0.018  0.000 0.000  0.274                
0.168  0.132  0.141 0.172  0.297  -0.059               Holding of the three largest 
shareholders 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000              
Size: Medium  0.014  0.013  0.014  0.021 0.058 0.085  0.023            
   0.428  0.458  0.419  0.237 0.000 0.000  0.097            
Size: Large  0.207  0.166  0.186  0.188 0.235 0.132  0.255  -0.374          
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000          
-0.086  -0.090  -0.095  -0.086 -0.161 -0.030  -0.305  0.051  -0.134          Taxes and regulations 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.033  0.000  0.000  0.000        
-0.077  -0.059  -0.060  -0.063 -0.073 -0.059  -0.114  0.050  -0.078  0.456       Tax administration 
regulations 
0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000      
-0.101  -0.081  -0.094  -0.095 -0.059 -0.058  -0.143  0.011  -0.088  0.250  0.237     Confidence in the judicial 
system 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.432  0.000  0.000  0.000    
Log (GDP pc)  0.028  0.041  0.014  0.027 0.050 0.005  0.070  0.026  0.027  0.008  -0.073  -0.208   
  0.108  0.020  0.413  0.132 0.000 0.739  0.000  0.062  0.059  0.592  0.000  0.000   
Regulatory quality  0.082 0.075  0.075  0.070  0.136  -0.017  0.259  -0.048  0.063  -0.180  -0.162  -0.282  0.724 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.222  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: P-values reported below correlation coefficients. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Influence on the Government 
(ordered probit regressions, coefficients reported) 
 
  
Extent of Influence Firms Have On:  
(1=never influential; 5=very influential) 
   Executive  Legislature  Ministries Regulatory  agencies
Company is owned by a foreign investor  0.039  -0.011  0.088  0.052 
 (0.60)  (0.17)  (1.49)  (0.83) 
Company is owned by the government  0.294  0.137  0.257  0.236 
 (4.42)***  (1.61)*  (3.15)***  (2.81)*** 
Holding of the three largest shareholders  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.003 
 (2.43)**  (1.99)**  (1.95)*  (2.75)*** 
Size: Medium  0.339  0.270  0.304  0.300 
 (4.31)***  (3.34)***  (3.31)***  (3.59)*** 
Size: Large  0.663  0.546  0.622  0.592 
 (6.91)***  (5.30)***  (6.49)***  (6.03)*** 
Number of competitors  -0.129  -0.114  -0.107  -0.083 
 (2.74)***  (2.78)***  (2.32)**  (1.83)* 
Manufacturing 0.246  0.189  -0.006  -0.042 
 (1.45)  (0.85)  (0.03)  (0.19) 
Service 0.350  0.222  0.052  0.077 
 (1.88)*  (0.97)  (0.29)  (0.33) 
Agriculture 0.257  0.145  -0.112  -0.045 
 (1.26)  (0.61)  (0.58)  (0.17) 
Construction 0.235  0.125  -0.011  0.028 
 (1.28)  (0.59)  (0.06)  (0.12) 
Regulatory quality   0.210  0.154  0.230  0.159 
 (2.25)**  (1.70)*  (2.97)***  (1.98)** 
Log(GDP pc)  -0.159  -0.092  -0.168  -0.129 
 (2.00)**  (1.12)  (2.55)**  (1.88)* 
Observations 3256  3258  3248  3197 
Number of countries  53.00  53.00  53.00  53.00 
Log pseudo likelihood  -3139.67  -3102.01  -3141.89  -3278.24 
Pseudo R-sq  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.04 
Chi-sq 189.48  73.97  141.08  144.32 
Notes: Robust z statistics are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 5. Influence on the Government  
and Constraints for Firm Growth  
(ordered probit regressions, coefficients reported) 
 
   General Constraints for Growth: 
  




Taxes and regulations 
-0.048 -0.042  -0.181  Company is owned by a foreign investor 
(0.92) (0.61) (2.18)** 
-0.261 -0.213  -0.164  Company is owned by the government 
(3.47)*** (2.30)**  (2.05)** 
Holding of the three largest shareholders  -0.000 -0.000  -0.002 
  (0.40) (0.29)  (1.28) 
Size: Medium  0.013 0.155  0.177 
  (0.24) (2.90)***  (3.44)*** 
Size: Large  -0.034 -0.055  -0.040 
  (0.44) (0.80)  (0.48) 
Number of competitors  0.078 0.137  0.174 
  (1.51) (3.35)***  (3.43)*** 
Manufacturing  0.006 0.687  0.448 
  (0.02) (4.31)*** (2.12)** 
Service  -0.015 0.698  0.395 
  (0.07) (4.66)*** (2.07)** 
Agriculture  -0.232 0.698  0.384 
  (0.90) (3.50)*** (1.62)* 
Construction  -0.007 0.856  0.473 
  (0.03) (5.08)*** (2.30)** 
Regulatory quality   -0.421 -0.315  -0.341 
  (3.55)*** (3.61)***  (2.75)*** 
Log(GDP pc)  0.036 0.101  0.034 
  (0.47) (1.93)*  (0.45) 
-0.067 -0.043  -0.046  Influence on the executive 
(2.96)*** (2.48)**  (1.64)* 
Observations 3220  3239  3241 
Num. Of countries  53.00  53.00  53.00 
Log pseudo likelihood  -5257.09  -4149.60  -3746.22 
Pseudo R-sq  0.04  0.03  0.05 
Chi-sq 120.84  152.76  185.11 
Notes: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.   23
Table 6. Influence on the Government 
and Constraints for Firm Growth 
(ordered probit regressions, selected coefficients reported) 
 
   General Constraints for Growth:  
  




Taxes and regulations 
-0.050 -0.031  -0.065  Influence on the legislature 
(2.12)** (1.78)*  (2.25)** 
Observations  3224 3241  3243 
Number of countries  53.00 53.00  53.00 
Pseudo R-sq  0.04 0.03  0.05 
-0.063 -0.028  -0.064  Influence on the ministries 
(2.50)** (1.62)*  (2.29)** 
Observations  3214 3231  3233 
Num. of countries  53.00 53.00  53.00 
Pseudo R-sq  0.04 0.03  0.05 
-0.060 -0.032  -0.050  Influence on regulatory agencies 
(2.02)** (1.83)*  (1.73)* 
Observations  3164 3180  3182 
Num. of countries  53.00 53.00  53.00 
Pseudo R-sq  0.04 0.03  0.05 
Notes: All coefficients obtained from regressions similar to those reported on Table 5. Robust z-statistics are in 
parentheses clustered at the country level. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. 
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Table 7. Overall Effect between Influence on Government and Regulatory Quality 
on Constraints for Firm Growth 
 








Influence on the executive  -0.063 -0.037  -0.046 
  (2.62)*** (1.93)*  (1.48) 
-0.016 -0.021  0.001  Influence on the executive*(regulatory 
quality)   (0.53) (0.99)  (0.03) 
Overall effect of influence on the executive   -0.066 -0.041  -0.046 
  (2.87)*** (2.26)***  (1.60)* 
Influence on the legislature  -0.046 -0.024  -0.068 
  (1.85)* (1.23)  (2.04)** 
-0.020 -0.28  0.008  Influence on the legislature *(regulatory 
quality)  (0.77) (1.30)  (0.24) 
-0.049 -0.029  -0.065  Overall effect of influence on the legislature  
(2.08)** (1.64)*  (2.22)** 
Influence on the ministries  -0.056 -0.022  -0.063 
  (2.08)** (1.15)  (2.07)** 
-0.040 -0.030  -0.006  Influence on the ministries *(regulatory 
quality)  (1.42) (1.53)  (0.18) 
-0.064 -0.027  -0.064  Overall effect of influence on the ministries  
(2.55)*** (1.55)  (2.26)** 
Influence on regulatory agencies  -0.059 -0.028  -0.061 
   (1.78)* (1.41)  (1.97)* 
-0.005 -0.019  0.044  Influence on regulatory agencies 
*(regulatory quality)  (0.14) (0.94)  (1.27) 
-0.06 -0.031  -0.052  Overall effect of influence on regulatory 
agencies  
(2.00)* (1.74)*  (1.89)* 
Notes: Robust z statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; 
 *** significant at 1 percent. Coefficients estimated after ordered probit regressions. The specification is 
similar to the ones shown in Table 6, adding the interactive terms between the influence variable and the 
regulatory quality. The overall effects are evaluated at the mean value of the regulatory quality. 
 
   25
Appendix. Table A.1 
Determinants of Influence on the Government 
(ordered probit regressions, marginal effects) 
 
   Extent of Influence Firms Have on the Executive (1=never influential; 5=very influential)
   Pr[Y=1 | X]  Pr[Y=2 | X]  Pr[Y=3 | X]  Pr[Y=4 | X]  Pr[Y=5 | X] 
Company is owned by a foreign 
investor  -0.014    0.006   0.004   0.002   0.001  
  (-0.60)   (-0.60)   (0.59)   (0.59)   (0.59)   
Company is owned by the government  -0.112    0.043    0.035    0.020    0.014   
  (-4.30)  *** (4.75) *** (4.02) ***  (3.40) *** (3.10) ***
Holding of the three largest SH  -0.001    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
  (-2.45)  *** (2.43) **  (2.38) **  (2.35) **  (2.34) ** 
Size:  Medium  -0.125    0.053   0.038   0.020   0.014  
  (-4.32)  *** (3.74) *** -4.700 ***  (3.87) *** (3.93) ***
Size:  Large  -0.254    0.085   0.079   0.050   0.041  
  (-6.85)  *** (6.34) *** (7.02) ***  (4.86) *** (4.27) ***
Number  of  competitors  0.047   -0.021   -0.014   -0.007   -0.005  
  (2.73) *** (-2.52) **  (-2.84) ***  (-2.62) *** (-2.77) ***
Manufacturing  -0.091    0.038   0.028   0.015   0.010  
  (-1.45)    (1.44)   (1.45)   (1.41)   (1.39)  
Service  -0.128    0.055   0.038   0.020   0.014  
  (-1.91)  *  (1.86) *  (1.93) *  (1.84) *  (1.87) * 
Agriculture  -0.097    0.038   0.030   0.017   0.012  
  (-1.23)    (1.33)   (1.23)   (1.12)   (1.07)  
Construction  -0.089    0.035   0.027   0.015   0.011  
  (-1.25)    (1.34)   (1.24)   (1.15)   (1.11)  
Regulatory  quality  -0.077    0.034   0.023   0.012   0.008  
  (-2.24)  **  (2.17) **  (2.26) **  (2.15) **  (2.23) ** 
Log(GDP  pc)  0.058   -0.026   -0.017   -0.009   -0.006  
    (1.97) **  (-1.97) *  (-1.96) **  (-1.87) *  (-1.87) * 
Notes: The number of observations is 3,256 in 53 countries, the Log-likelihood is -3139.67, the Pseudo-R-squared is 0.05, and the 
corresponding Chi-Squared is 189.48. The marginal coefficients shown in this table come from the regression shown in the Firms 
column of Table 4. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. * Significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Appendix: Table A.2 
Influence on the Government and Constraints for Firm Growth 
(Ordered probit regressions, marginal effects) 
 
  Confidence in the Judicial System Today 
  Pr[Y=1 | X]  Pr[Y=2 | X]  Pr[Y=3 | X]  Pr[Y=4 | X]  Pr[Y=5 | X]  Pr[Y=6 | X] 
0.007 0.008  0.004  -0.005  -0.007  -0.007  Company is owned by a 
foreign investor  -0.890 (0.91)  (0.97)  (-0.88)  (-0.92)  (-0.95) 
0.042 0.046  0.012  -0.031  -0.037  -0.032  Company is owned by the 
government  (2.90)*** (3.48)***  (2.21)**  (-3.15)***  (-3.51)  (-4.01)*** 
Holding of the three largest 
shareholders  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
  (0.41) (0.4)  (0.39)  (-0.40)  (-0.4)  (-0.4) 
Size: Medium  -0.002 -0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002 
  (-0.23) (-0.24)  (-0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
Size: Large  0.005 0.006  0.003  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.44) (0.44)  (0.45)  (-0.43)  (-0.44)  (-0.45) 
Number of competitors  -0.011 -0.014  -0.006  0.008  0.011  0.011 
  (-1.41) (-1.50)  (-1.62)*  (1.5)  (1.51)  (1.52) 
Manufacturing  -0.001  -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.001 
  (-0.02) (-0.02)  (-0.02)  -0.020  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Service  0.002 0.003  0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)  (-0.07)  (-0.07)  (-0.07) 
Agriculture  0.037 0.041  0.011  -0.027  -0.033  -0.029 
  (0.76) (0.92)  (2.32)**  (-0.81)  (-0.94)  (-1.07) 
Construction  0.001 0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)  (-0.03)  (-0.03)  (-0.03) 
Regulatory quality   -0.005 -0.006  -0.003  0.004  0.005  0.005 
  (-0.48) (-0.47)  (-0.46)  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
Log(GDP pc)  0.059 0.074  0.033  -0.044  -0.062  -0.060 
  (3.79)*** (3.53)***  (2.26)**  (-3.49)***  (-3.41)***  (-3.43)*** 
0.009 0.012  0.005  -0.007  -0.010  -0.010  Influence on the executive 
(3.13)*** (2.92)***  (2.10)**  (-2.88)***  (-3.02)***  (-2.81)*** 
The number of observations is 3,220 in 53 countries, the Log-likelihood is -5257.09, the Pseudo-R-squared is 0.04, and the 
corresponding Chi-Squared is 120.84. The marginal coefficients shown in this table come from the regression shown in the Firms 
column of Table 5. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. * Significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1percent. 
 
 